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Sovereignty is a term that does not appear in the United Nations Charter 
with respect to limitations on the use of armed force, but it is often part of 
claims and analyses regarding the difference between permissible and 
impermissible uses of force and intervention. Is sovereignty merely relevant 
with respect to claims of states to independent power or authority? Is it a 
construct or process that has been related also to other actors within the 
international legal process? How has the notion of sovereignty been used 
with respect to claims in favor of freedom from outside use of armed force 
and in favor of armed intervention? 
First, when addressing such questions, it should be noted that there have 
been many formal actors and participants in the international legal process 
other than the state. Claims of rigid state-oriented positivists, especially at 
the beginning of the last century, that states were the only actors with 
competencies, rights, and duties under treaty-based and customary 
international law were patently false. Quite clearly, this recognition is 
relevant to the notion of sovereignty or retained authority since it would not 
be incorrect to note that sovereignty has not been held merely by states. 
Within the international legal process, other actors such as nations, tribal 
groups and peoples can be understood to have claims to relative sovereignty 
as well. Yet, the state remains a primary actor and one that claims a relative 
sovereignty or independence. 
Interestingly, if you use Westlaw or Lexis to search for use of the term 
“sovereignty” in our federal courts, you will discover claims of the 
Founders and Framers that sovereignty is in the people of the United States, 
in all of us, and not in any particular political entity. That is because of our 
democratic revolution in the 1700’s and shared expectations that authority 
exists with and can be delegated by the people, and it is not simplistically in 
any institutional arrangement that people create. For example, the preamble 
to the United States Constitution states that “[w]e the People of the United 
States . . . do ordain and establish” the Constitution and the federal 
government, not the states or some magnanimous elite. This notion of 
authority in the people has also found expression in international law. For 
example, the preamble to the United Nations Charter states similarly that 
“[w]e the Peoples of the United Nations” have created the Charter, not the 
states or other actors in the international legal process. The United Nations 
Charter also identifies the right of self-determination as a right of peoples, 
not states, and certain forms of human rights law require that the legitimacy 
of any state’s government reflect the will of the people and not merely that 
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of state elites. An example of such a human right is reflected in Article 
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
A second aspect of sovereignty is worth stressing. Under international 
law, sovereignty is not absolute. This is especially so in an increasingly 
interdependent world. It was recognized, for example, by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice that sovereignty is relative. More generally, 
with respect to distinctions between permissible and impermissible 
intervention or what some term the norm of non-intervention, it is important 
to realize that one criterion often reiterated is contained in the delimiting 
phrase “external or internal affairs of” a particular state that is reflected, for 
example, in the normative statement that states have an “obligation not to 
intervene in the affairs of any other state.” But general patterns of practice 
and legal expectation over time have shifted the focus slightly to save from 
intervention that which is the affair merely of one state as opposed to that of 
the international community. Adding to the complexity, the affair of merely 
one state as such may not be the same as the affair of other actors within 
that state, such as a relevant nation or peoples, and the latter may more 
adequately relate to the affairs of a regional or global community. 
Violations of human rights are not simply the affair of a single state, nor 
are international crimes such as genocide in Rwanda or Darfur. In 2005, the 
international community also recognized what it terms the state’s 
responsibility to protect—an obligation of all states. However, in 2005, the 
international community apparently would not go further than stating that a 
particular state has a responsibility to protect its own people from certain 
deprivations and that if it fails it can be subject to certain sanctions such as 
political, diplomatic, economic, and perhaps juridic sanctions if the state 
agrees to such; but the community did not declare that violators can be 
subject to military sanctions involving use of armed force and/or 
intervention. More generally, there has been a split within the international 
community concerning the propriety of humanitarian intervention involving 
the use of armed force without prior authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council or a relevant regional organization such as NATO, the 
Organization of American States (O.A.S.), or the Organization of African 
Unity (O.A.U.). Quite clearly, such forms of humanitarian intervention as a 
sanction response would be an inroad on state sovereignty, but state 
sovereignty is not absolute to begin with and international law clearly 
conditions what a state may do to its own people within its own territory. 
Another inroad on state sovereignty that has been agreed to by the 
international community involves permissible use of force in self-defense. 
There is a rich history of use of such an inroad on sovereignty under 
customary international law, and today Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter allows a member state to use self-defense “if an armed attack 
occurs.” Additionally, as Colonel Wollschlaeger remarked, parties to the 
U.N. Charter have recognized the power and authority of the Security 
Council to authorize the use of armed force as an enforcement measure in 
2011] Relative Sovereignty and Permissible Use of Armed Force 3 
 
case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression—
assuming that a majority makes a decision to that effect and that it is not 
obviated by a veto of one or more of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council (which must be exercised, as the Soviet Union learned 
when it walked out of the room during the Korean war and had thought that 
its mere abstention would operate as a veto). This form of Security Council 
enforcement action occurred recently in the case of Libya. Clearly, the 
authority of the Security Council represents an inroad on sovereignty that 
has been accepted by each member of the U.N. and the international 
community as a whole. 
An interesting example of such an inroad occurred with respect to use of 
apartheid by the regime in South Africa during the last century. I remember 
the claim of the apartheid regime in the 1980s when the Security Council 
recognized that the system of apartheid constituted a threat to the peace. 
“What do you mean threat to the peace,” they said, “just leave us alone and 
keep our neighbors out of our country and there will be no threat to the 
peace.” The Security Council did not back down and issued various types of 
sanctions not amounting to the use of armed force. The U.N. General 
Assembly also responded in 1984 that the apartheid regime was illegal, that 
the people of South Africa have a right to overthrow the government and to 
receive outside assistance during their struggle for political self-
determination—what we term self-determination assistance involving the 
use of military force. Such outside armed force by other members in support 
of the people of South Africa did not occur, but the regime fell in the face of 
other forms of sanction and internal revolution. It is another example of 
Security Council and General Assembly inroads of sovereignty—inroads 
that are lawful and preferred by the international community in given 
contexts. 
Another permissible inroad on sovereignty that can result in the use of 
armed force involves what the United Nations Charter terms “regional 
action.” Under Article 52 of the Charter, a regional organization concerned 
with peace and security can authorize “regional action,” at least until the 
Security Council decides that such is not appropriate, which decision of the 
Council would be subject to a veto by one or more of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. “Enforcement action” as such can only be 
authorized by the Security Council, but the Charter expressly recognizes the 
possibility of “regional action” by a relevant regional organization, and such 
action would clearly be a permissible inroad on state sovereignty.  
Use of armed force in Kosovo in the 1990s under the authorization of 
NATO was an example, although, in my opinion, too many European states 
and text-writers have not agreed on the propriety of use of force in Kosovo. 
Recently in the case of Libya, the Arab League authorized use of force to 
create a no-fly zone over Libya before the Security Council acted to do the 
same and to further authorize use of armed force in Libya to protect 
civilians from armed attacks and threats of armed attack. The United States 
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was involved in the1960s in a regional action when interdicting Soviet 
missiles from coming into Cuba, under an authorization of the O.A.S. The 
U.S. did not say that it was engaged in a self-defense operation under 
Article 51 of the Charter. The U.S. stated that it was engaged in a regional 
action, according to an authorization from a regional organization; the U.S. 
was very careful not to mention the word “blockade,” which is an act of 
war, but that it was interdicting Soviet vessels. The remainder of my 
remarks will focus on issues concerning sovereignty, human rights, and the 
laws of self-defense and war in connection with U.S. use of armed drones in 
Pakistan as well as in Yemen. While doing so, I will address points that 
have been made in far more detail (often with extensive footnotes) in my 
article in Florida State University’s Journal of Transnational Law on Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan.  
One of those points involves some disagreement with Colonel 
Wollschlaeger and others concerning the status of the ongoing armed 
conflict in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan where the actual theatre of war 
has migrated. The Colonel was discussing issues concerning combatant 
status and combatant immunity of our military personnel that can pertain in 
case of an international armed conflict. Importantly, if the United States 
sends its armed forces abroad to engage in fighting and they engage in 
combat, we should recognize that such conduct has internationalized 
whatever armed conflict had been occurring, that our military personnel are 
participating in an international armed conflict so that they can have 
combatant and prisoner of war status as well as combatant immunity for 
lawful acts of war that pertains during an international armed conflict. What 
specifically does that give them? To lay this out a little bit more, any lawful 
military action during an international armed conflict is immune from 
criminal prosecution, and if you are not a combatant with combatant 
immunity, you are an unprivileged fighter, like various members of al 
Qaeda. Moreover, members of al Qaeda are not likely to be “combatants” as 
that term is used in the laws of war. Under the normal test, which requires 
that they be members of the regular armed forces of a party to an 
international armed conflict (such as the Taliban), most members of al 
Qaeda would not have combatant status. They would be unprivileged 
fighters that had engaged in actual fighting or unprivileged belligerents. I 
would not use the word “combatant” or the word “belligerent” because it 
gets confusing. Combatants are members of the regular armed forces of a 
party to an international armed conflict. They are subject to criminal 
prosecution for any unprivileged conduct, not as a war crime, but as the 
Colonel recognized, under relevant domestic law. Relevant domestic law 
might include that of Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the United States. 
For example, members of al Qaeda who engage in unprivileged fighting or 
violence are subject to prosecution for murder for killing another person. 
The U.S. soldier fighting in Afghanistan would not be if the U.S. soldier has 
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combatant status and combatant immunity and kills in an otherwise lawful 
manner under the laws of war. That’s why I think we should protect our 
military personnel by recognizing that they are participating in an 
international armed conflict whenever they are deployed abroad to engage 
in fighting.  
Under 19th Century international law, if the U.S. aided a recognized 
government to fight insurgents, the U.S. would not be involved in an 
international armed conflict. Yet, if the U.S. aids the insurgents fighting the 
government, it is well recognized that the U.S. is engaged in an international 
armed conflict. And if you are directly involved in a belligerency, like the 
United States armed forces during the U.S. Civil War (when the 
Confederate States of America (CSA) controlled territory as its own, which 
al Qaeda never has; the CSA had the semblance of a government, which I 
don’t think al Qaeda has had; the CSA could field military units in sustained 
hostilities, and I don’t think al Qaeda has done that; and when the CSA had 
outside recognition as a belligerent by England and certain other countries 
and, therefore, met the test for a belligerent), you are directly involved in 
what is known as an international armed conflict to which all of the 
customary laws of war apply. 
Moreover, under the laws of war, it is the fact of war that determines—
that drives application of the laws of war and proper labeling of the conflict. 
So we should be looking at actual context, and it is not critical whether a 
particular state has recognized that it is involved in a war or international 
armed conflict. The critical issue is whether there is in fact an armed 
conflict—what is termed a de facto armed conflict. This criterion, the fact of 
war, is relevant to proper consideration of the fighting or armed conflict 
occurring in Pakistan, especially around fluid border areas near 
Afghanistan. Our soldiers are getting killed and wounded in and near those 
areas and we are killing and wounding an enemy, at least the Taliban. The 
armed conflict has migrated, as a de facto theatre of war, into Pakistan and 
the laws of war provide rights and duties as well as competencies in terms 
of who you can target and when you can target them. Application of the 
laws of war to this expanded international armed conflict should be part of 
one’s use of the war and law of war paradigms and part of the recognition 
that they are applicable to parts of Pakistan even though one can disagree 
with the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration when they 
have stated that we are at war with al Qaeda (a non-state actor that has never 
achieved the level of an insurgent) because under international law the U.S. 
simply cannot be at war with al Qaeda as such. 
Of course, we were at war with the Taliban, especially when we went 
into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 and were immediately fighting their 
regular armed forces and, with some embarrassment, discovered military 
personnel from Pakistan who were helping the Taliban fight the Northern 
Alliance during an international armed conflict that had been at least a 
belligerency. Members of al Qaeda within that theatre of war were covered 
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under the laws of war. They had rights and duties as civilians and could be 
prosecuted under domestic law as unprivileged fighters, but they would not 
have been combatants or entitled to prisoner of war status like members of 
the regular armed forces of the Taliban. John Walker Lindh reportedly took 
an actual oath of allegiance with the Taliban military, and he might have 
been considered a combatant and entitled to combatant immunity for lawful 
acts of war, like shooting at enemy soldiers, but I suspect that his defense 
counsel did not adequately raise such claims before a relevant court. In any 
event, enemy combatants such as members of the armed forces of the 
Taliban and civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities (DPH) are 
also lawfully targetable during an international armed conflict. Certainly 
each of these points about status, competencies, rights and duties under the 
laws of war are also potential inroads on state sovereignty, inroads that are 
applicable in the context of war.  
One such inroad during war and within the war and laws of war 
paradigms involves who you can lawfully target in a foreign country when 
the de facto theatre of war has migrated to such a country. In the case of 
parts of Pakistan, for example, where the top Taliban leader in Pakistan is 
directly involved in operations and is directing attacks on U.S. soldiers in 
Afghanistan, the top Taliban leader in Pakistan can be lawfully targeted 
without Pakistani consent. This is because the theatre of war is partly there, 
over the head of the Taliban leader, as it was over the head of Osama bin 
Laden. If there was a breach of the neutrality of Pakistan and its 
sovereignty, it was a breach by al Qaeda and the Taliban. And it should be 
noted that private individuals and other non-state actors can breach 
neutrality under international law. For example, in 1793 the United States 
prosecuted Gideon Henfield, a private actor, for his conduct in breach of 
U.S. neutrality with respect to the war between England and France. 
With respect to U.S. use of armed force in Pakistan to target those who 
are lawfully targetable under the laws of war and during a de facto war that 
has migrated into parts of Pakistan, some might claim that the United States 
would need the consent of Pakistan for each such targeting, that the 
targetings are violations of Pakistani sovereignty. As noted, however, such a 
claim would be incorrect. Such lawful inroads on sovereignty are 
permissible when viewing the use of force under war and law of war 
paradigms. But the alternative that one should use, some might say, is a law 
enforcement paradigm. Well, generally under international law, if one uses 
merely a law enforcement paradigm and the state is in a law enforcement 
mode, the state can only engage in law enforcement in a foreign state with 
the consent of the highest level officials of the government of that foreign 
state—therefore, with the consent of the government in the territory from 
which the attacks are emanating. With respect to armed attacks emanating 
from Pakistan, I would say that the situation is not simplistically one 
involving law enforcement or the law enforcement paradigm, especially 
when the U.S. is targeting the top Taliban leader who is involved in 
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ordering the killing of U.S. soldiers, or training people, directing operations 
from maybe a computer or cell phone, and so forth. 
With respect to Yemen, when the United States targets a member of al 
Qaeda who is directly involved in armed attacks on the United States or 
even U.S. military in Afghanistan, is this a circumstance to be addressed 
simplistically as a mere law enforcement paradigm? If a member of al 
Qaeda is giving orders to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, has the theatre of 
war migrated to Yemen where he actually engages in such conduct? I would 
say yes, and it is not necessary to argue that we are at “war” with al Qaeda. 
Are we stuck with two or three paradigms—a war and law of war 
paradigm on the one hand and a law enforcement paradigm on the other? 
My article on self-defense targetings demonstrates why the answer is no. 
There is another paradigm that we should be thinking about. It is the self-
defense paradigm and it involves inquiry into the legality of conduct under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The article provides a great deal of detail 
concerning the propriety of targetings in a foreign state as a matter of 
permissible self-defense. 
After 9/11, even some writers who were opposed to that kind of 
interpretation of Article 51 came on board. Article 51 states that use of force 
is permissible in the case of an armed attack. It does not limit permissibility 
of self-defense measures in terms of who engaged in an armed attack. 
Moreover, patterns of practice and patterns of expectation about such 
practice demonstrate, especially after 9/11, that a state can engage in self-
defense against those who are attacking the country, its embassies abroad, 
and its military abroad. And it is fairly well recognized that an attack on a 
state’s nationals is an attack on the state. Al Qaeda has been attacking our 
nationals, at least since its attacks on our embassies, the attack on the USS 
Cole, and the attack on 9/11, and they continue to attack our soldiers, at 
least our solders in Afghanistan. 
In Yemen, do we have a U.S. national who is engaged in more than 
recruiting people and propagandizing for al Qaeda? Is this person involved 
in operations? Think about the underwear bomber who came from Yemen 
and the bags that were placed on a FedEx aircraft and you start to see an 
interesting picture: maybe he is also directly involved in operations. And if 
he is, as noted more generally in my article, and we are outside of the 
context of war, we would not be talking about a person who was DPH (a 
Direct Participant in Hostilities) and a targetable civilian. But he could be a 
DPAA (a Direct Participant in Armed Attacks). If an al Qaeda operative is 
directly participating in armed attacks against the United States, I point out 
that he is targetable under the law of self-defense in time of peace or in time 
of war wherever he is engaging in such conduct. There is no geographic 
limitation on exercise of the right of self-defense. Clearly, permissible self-
defense targetings can be an inroad on sovereignty and any other geographic 
limits.  
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I would like to challenge you to think about this further, but my 
conclusions have been that a state can use military force to target non-state 
DPAA who engage in such conduct within a foreign state, using the general 
principles that are well recognized to condition military force, under use of 
force principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality, and borrowing 
somewhat from related principles of the laws of war. In terms of the 
principle of distinction under the laws of war, we distinguish between 
civilians and DPH civilians (who are targetable) and combatants (who are 
targetable); and under the self-defense paradigm, one can use the same 
background or basic principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality 
and apply them as part of inquiry concerning restraints on the use of force.  
Moreover, the United States and any other state that is being attacked by 
a non-state actor does not need special consent of the territorial state from 
which those attacks emanate. This may be problematic for some of our 
neighbors to the south who have for a hundred years been leery of Big 
Brother intervening, under various pretexts, in their countries. We 
generalize that a lot of Central American, especially Mexico, and South 
American states are very restrictive in their interpretation of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter as if it prohibits all armed force instead of 
merely the three categories of force expressed therein. And they are very 
restrictive more generally about permissibility of use of force in self-
defense. I am much more open regarding the proper interpretation of Article 
2(4), but I agree with many others that in cases of self-defense under Article 
51, you need an armed attack. In any event, with respect to al Qaeda, there 
has been a process of armed attacks against the United States and its 
nationals and we do not need the consent of the territorial state from which 
those attacks emanate in order to engage in legitimate responsive measures 
of self-defense.  
Of course, this may create some diplomatic problems, but there has often 
been acceptance of such forms of self-defense. For example, there was 
acceptance during the famous Caroline incident in 1837 when the U.S. was 
rather weak and the British oppressors in Canada were still controlling 
Canada. At that time, there was an insurgent group of about one thousand 
people that had marched to Toronto and had failed to take over Toronto, but 
they took over Navy Island, near Niagara Falls. The Caroline was a ship 
that, on the day that it was attacked, had traversed back and forth into 
Canadian waters and had delivered arms, ammunition, and personnel to 
support the insurgency. It was targetable under the law of self-defense, but 
the U.S. and Britain disagreed whether the actual targeting was necessary 
under the circumstances. The British sent two teams into the U.S. and 
destroyed the Caroline. They did it at night, and as it was burning, it went 
over Niagara Falls. There were two deaths—one dead for sure and one 
missing. We complained that the British were using military force in our 
country without our consent. We recognized that Britain (on behalf of 
Canada) had the right of self-defense. The whole debate was about the 
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propriety of actual measures of self-defense that the British used. Self-
defense against non-state actors—the insurgents—was not a problem, but 
we claimed that the method and means used had to meet a test that we 
preferred, although the British disagreed with the test. Under our fairly 
restrictive test at the time, there had to be an instant, overwhelming 
necessity tied to the actual method that they chose and, in context, they 
could have waited in those days until that U.S. ship entered Canadian 
waters. It would have been rather easy to grab the ship at that point as 
opposed to entering U.S. territory. 
During the debate, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster addressed 
sovereignty. He stated that sovereignty is an important or major principle 
that is related to equality, but we recognized that another major principle 
also exists: the right of self-defense, and in context, the right to engage in 
self-defense against non-state actor attacks without the consent of the 
territorial state. Nonetheless, Webster claimed that the British method and 
means violated relevant principles of necessity and proportionality. Later, 
one of the British participants wrote that there was no doubt that if there had 
been an artillery emplacement in the United States and it was firing across 
the river, the British would have had the right to take out that artillery 
emplacement. It is my point that such a claim would be correct today, that 
you can target the artillery emplacement without the consent of the 
territorial state. 
One point needs to be emphasized because some text-writers have 
claimed that if you are not under the law of war paradigm, you have to meet 
the standards for law enforcement measures and you have to get consent 
from the territorial state. There is a stricter test of necessity in a law 
enforcement setting as such, and such claimants sometimes point to a 
restrictive view expressed by the European Court of Human Rights. 
However, the European Court has also recognized, for example, that Russia, 
with respect to the Chechnya conflict, was not simplistically involved 
merely in a law enforcement paradigm and necessity gave way to the type 
of reasonable necessity that is tolerated in the law of war context. From my 
perspective, when the right of self-defense against non-state actor armed 
attacks is claimed, we do not need the consent of the territorial state and we 
do not have to be at war with the state from whose territory the non-state 
actor attacks emanate. The United States and Britain did not think they were 
at war during the Caroline incident, and they were not. When Bill Clinton 
sent 75 cruise missiles into Afghanistan to take out al Qaeda, we did not 
think we were at war with Afghanistan and the international community did 
not think that there was an armed conflict between the United States and 
Afghanistan. Yet, after 9/11 occurred we did participate in an international 
armed conflict—in part because we did not merely go after al Qaeda, we 
also went after the Taliban. 
Some raise another paradigm—a human rights paradigm. When one 
considers actual trends in decision over time and the many evidences of 
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patterns of legal expectation, at least from the 1860s, it is obvious that 
human rights apply during war. The critical questions are: what human 
rights apply, to what person, and in what context? One such human right is 
the right to life. What is the human right to life? I have read claims that the 
use of drones to target people in Pakistan may be a violation of the victims’ 
or the targets’ human right to life. Is that true? The human right to life, as 
phrased in various documents, is recognized as a freedom from “arbitrary” 
deprivation of life. But what is an “arbitrary” deprivation of life in the 
context of permissible self-defense or war? Moreover, human rights law 
does not reach certain persons unless they are within a state’s jurisdiction or 
effective control. Was the top Taliban leader in Pakistan who was targeted 
by a drone within the jurisdiction of the United States? Not under 
international law. Was that person in our effective control when the drone 
might have been at 10,000 feet? Not in my opinion, and I think not in terms 
of common sense. If so, human rights law did not provide relevant 
protection to such a person. Moreover, if it had applied, the freedom with 
respect to the right to life would have been a freedom from arbitrary 
deprivation of life. You are lawyers, or going to be lawyers. You know that 
that word is malleable. It is the kind of word that you can drive trucks 
through. It is not self-operative. It has to be applied in context. It’s a lower 
standard than that under the laws of war or the law of self-defense—much 
looser than reasonable necessity and proportionality in terms of targeting. In 
a given case, it may not be necessary to target someone, but it also may not 
be arbitrary to do so.  
So human rights law does apply, but who does it apply to, and where, 
and who is in your jurisdiction or effective control? What exactly are the 
human rights that are at stake? When a state controls a detainee, of course, 
the detainee is in the effective control of the state, even if the detainee is 
outside the jurisdiction of the state and, of course, the state cannot lawfully 
engage in torture, cruel treatment, inhuman treatment, or degrading 
treatment. As we now know, such was part of an admitted policy and 
program of George Bush. He stated in October 2006 that he had a program 
of secret detention (which involves admitted crimes against humanity) and 
enhanced interrogation which included waterboarding—which the world 
knows amounts to torture and, if not, at least to cruel and inhuman 
treatment. Mistreatment of a detainee violates human rights law in time of 
peace or war, as well as the laws of war during war. 
Finally, there have been some interesting aspects about who is targetable 
during war that were raised by the Colonel, concerning who is a DPH and, 
therefore, who is targetable during war. I would like you to also think about 
persons who are DPAA when using the self-defense paradigm. What 
restraints on the use of force would you recommend, and why? If you think 
we should change the law, if we should change it in a certain direction, what 
would you recommend and why? 
 
